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BRIEF IN REPLY

As to the Appellant's first issue on appeal, namely: that the court allowed into evidence
testimony regarding a prior stalking charge which was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, the
Respondent fails to acknowledge the basic premise of the objection. The Appellant in this case
was charged with Falsifying Evidence by Offering Forged or Fraudulent Documents in Evidence
under I.C. § 18-2601. In order to prove the elements of the offense, the State was required to
show that evidence was offered upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry or investigation whatever
authorized or permitted by law. This necessitated logically that the state be able to show that a
prior proceeding, trial, inquiry, or investigation had in fact occurred in the past. Therefore, the
state filed a notice pursuant to IRE 404(b), and at the hearing, the state made clear that it was
filing this because in order to prove the elements of the charge, a prior act or proceeding was
necessary to prove. See Transcript of pretrial conference, at page 10, lines 9-25. The court, as
well, noted that the elements of the offense required a showing that there was, in fact, a prior
proceeding of some kind. See Id. The court stated that because of this, they did not even feel a
notice of IRE 404(b) was necessary. See id. The state also made clear that, "certainly the state
doesn't intend to belabor any of the underlying facts or circumstances, but to really, just to the
extent necessary, to establish the elements of the offense." See Id, at pp. 10-11, lines 23-5. It is to
this that the Defendant did not object. The Respondent on appeal asserts that this is an
"acquiescence" to all of the circumstances regarding the prior offense coming into the trial, and
that therefore this is a new objection on appeal. See Brief of Respondent, page 8. However, the
position of the Appellant has not changed, and is not new. The Appellant did not, and does not,
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object to the fact of an underlying proceeding coming into evidence to the extent necessary to
prove the elements of the case. The Respondent himself notes that this is not even a proper IRE
404(b) objection, when the prior proceeding is necessary to prove the elements of the offense.
What the Respondent fails to understand is that there is a difference between allowing the
fact of the underlying offense as existing and a carte blanche acceptance of all the facts and
circumstances of that offense coming into evidence. This is why the Appellant offered to
stipulate to the fact of the underlying offense when the state began to erroneously, and contrary
to its own assertions to the court made previously, to ask witnesses about the prior stalking
allegations and what they entailed. (The prior offense was not even one of stalking; it was to an
amended charge of Disturbing the Peace). To the assertion of the Respondent that the objections
to the evidence surrounding the stalking charge were not preserved on appeal, the Appellant
offers the following:
1. l

The Defendant first objected to the appearance of Prosecutor Starr as a witness for the
State in a Motion in Limine, stating that any information she had was not relevant and
would unduly prejudice the jury regarding the underlying offense. See Trial
Transcript, at Page 99-100, lines 20-9. The Defendant stated she was the Prosecutor
with regard to the original stalking charge, and that therefore; her testimony would be
unduly prejudicial and would confuse the issues as well. The State argued that the
prosecutor's testimony was necessary to establish an element of the offense and was
therefore relevant. However, as noted by defense counsel, the letters were not sent to
the prosecutor (they were sent to the Magistrate, who would be testifying later) and
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the elements of the offense were that the intent of the defendant was to offer the
letters into evidence, something she could offer no testimony regarding. Therefore,
the defense counsel argues her testimony would have a prejudicial effect that would
substantially and unfairly outweigh any relevance. See Id, at page l 03-104. The court
declined to grant the Defendant's motion in Limine, stating that it was relevant to the
offense charged because she could testify that there was in fact a proceeding. The
Judge did not conduct a balancing test or weigh the prejudicial effect of the
testimony. The Judge seemed to imply the testimony would be limited to the fact of a
prior proceeding. See Id, at page 105.
2. l

When Ms. Roggenbuck was testifying on redirect in the case, the State asked her
whether the defendant's conduct had ever "escalated". The Defendant objected as
overly prejudicial to go into the circumstances of the prior conduct. See Trial
Transcript, at page 169, lines 15-20. The court overruled the objection on the grounds
that it had previously been addressed at the 404(b) hearing and that because the nature
of the charge was preparing false evidence, that it was relevant and not unduly
prejudicial. She stated it was something they had discussed pretrial. See Id, at pages
169-170.
The witness was allowed to testify that he thought they had a relationship, and
were going to get married. She testified that he told her he had her license plate
memorized, and described her clothes. See Id. The Defendant renewed the objection,
offering to stipulate that there was a prior proceeding. See Id. The court stated they
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did not need to go "heavily into the details." See Id, at page 171. She declined to
strike the witness' response. See Id.
After the witness read the letter into evidence, over objection (to be addressed in
latter argument) the State asked her if it referred to conduct that happened in the
stalking charge, to which she responded that to her that is how his behavior was, that
whenever she tried to explain to him it wasn't real (the relationship) he would just be
like, "no,no. I can tell you really mean yes, when you say no. No, no, no." See Id, at
pages 175-176. All of this was highly prejudicial, an attack on the character of the
defendant that painted him in a certain light and had nothing to do with the current
charges.
The assertions from the Respondent that the Appellant did not make objections at trial
which he now raises on appeal are specious. There were clearly numerous objections to
witnesses being allowed to testify to anything other than the fact of a prior offense relevant to
prove the elements of the charge, which the state asserted was the only purpose during the
pretrial conference/hearing on IRE404(b) evidence of record.
The Respondent also asks this court to rule that because the defense merely objected, and
stated the grounds for the objection, without stating it was contrary to IRE 404(b ), that the
objection itself was not properly preserved. They cite State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72, 44 P.3d
1122, 1127 (2002) in support of this proposition. In that case, the court noted that, "An objection to
the admission of evidence must state the specific ground for the objection, if it is not apparent
from the context. State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334,796 P.2d 1007 (1990); LR.E. 103(a)(l).
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Cannady objected to the book in general as being irrelevant, but he did not specifically object to
or even mention the notations at issue, nor did he argue that the book, or anything in it,
constituted evidence of other crimes or ,vrongs. Because he did not base his objection upon Rule
404(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and such objection was not apparent from the context," it
was not preserved .. .See Id. In this case, clearly the basis for the objection was clear from the
context. The defense counsel objected numerous times to anything other the fact of the prior

offense, which had been the subject of an actual IRE404 (b) notice. To say it wasn't clear, when
objecting that anything other than the fact of the offense itself would be unduly prejudicial and
not relevant, that counsel was referring to other crimes, wrongs, or acts, as relating to the stalking
charge, is clearly false. The context should be patently clear from the statement, "Objection your
honor. We will stipulate there was a prior proceeding. We can't retry what happened. And this

is already trying to turn this into a stalking case." See Trial Transcript, at pagel 70, lines 23-25.
It is clear from the context of reference to another crime or act, and turning the current trial into
one regarding an irrelevant prior charge, of the basis of the objection. The Appellant does not
read Cannady as standing for the proposition that the magic words, "404(b )" must be uttered
every time there is an objection to another crime, wrong, or act, which would be prohibited
without notice. That is true especially in a circumstance such as this, where the notice was
limited by the state itself at the hearing.
The Appellant has also objected to the admission of three letters into evidence without
proper foundation. The Respondent correctly states that, "The test is whether the evidence is
"sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." LR.E.
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90l(a)." However, the Respondent then fails to distinguish between apparent relevance and
foundation, seemingly arguing that because there was evidence that these letters were submitted

to the courts as false evidence that foundation requirements were therefore satisfied. What the
proponent (the State) was claiming them to be were: letters written by the defendant, and
therefore false, in an effort made by him to get out of trouble.
The question is thus: was there sufficient evidence to show these letters were in fact
written by the defendant? The Appellant would agree, actual signatures are not required. In
denying the Defendant's Motion in Limine, the Court acknowledged that the state would have to
prove the Defendant was in fact the author of the letters. See Trial Transcript, at page 108.
After the Honorable Judge Watkins testified to the three letters he had received and the
manner in which he had received them, the State asked him to say what was in the letters. See
Trial Transcript, at page 141, line 20-25. The defendant objected on the grounds of hearsay (as it

had not been established they were statements made by the defendant). The court asked the state
if they were offering them into evidence and the state replied that they were. The defendant
renewed the previous objection (in the Motion in Limine) on the grounds that they had not been
authenticated. The court stated that, "There is considerably more that will have to be established.
But because- as I said earlier- I will admit these exhibits, subject to being stricken." See Id, at
page 141-142. The exhibits were, then, entered into evidence without proper foundation, subject
to being stricken. The court also stated at that time, "It will be critical that the State's case cover
who prepared the purported documents." See Id, at 142, line4-7 (emphasis added.) The question

then becomes, when was the proper foundation made?
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The Defendant then objected on the basis of hearsay once again, but because they were
not evidence? The objection was overruled. See Id, at page 142, line 19-22.
Later, when Ms. Roggenbuck was on the stand, the state asked her to read the letters into
evidence. See Trial Transcript, at page 173, line 15-19. The Defendant objected on the basis that
they had not laid a proper foundation. The court stated that it had been admitted, subject to being
stricken if the proper steps aren't made. See Id.
There was never any evidence produced by the state that the letters were in fact written
by Mr. Ruggiero, or of who prepared the documents. There was never any evidence sufficient to
show the letters were what the state purported them to be, which is written by the defendant.
They were never authenticated, and as such should not have been admitted into evidence. Ms.
Woody testified that he had a typewriter, he wrote on it rarely, and one time she saw him spray
something he wrote on it with perfume. See Id, at page 158-160. She did not testify she saw him
write the letters.
Nevertheless, the defendant asked the court to strike the letters when the state rested; on
the basis they had not laid a proper foundation. The court stated that the foundation could be
provided by circumstantial evidence. "The subject of the letter can be circumstantial evidence."

See Id. The court seemed to find it pertinent that the state's case would fail if she did not allow
them in, stating, "And I think the fact that it's aimed at side-railing a particular case is
sufficient." Id, at page 202-203. This should not be a consideration for whether proper
foundation was made.
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In this case, the circumstantial evidence the court found sufficient appears to be only the
content of what was in the letters. This is not the type of circumstantial evidence deemed
sufficient by Idaho courts to establish foundation. Rather, the circumstantial evidence standard
had been used in the contexts of emails and texts, where people don't sign written documents.
Evidence which has been deemed sufficient is not what was said in them, which would lead to an
absurd result, but identifying computer characteristics, or metadata, linking the individual to the
email. "[C]ourts have held that circumstantial evidence establishing that the evidence was what
the proponent claimed it to be was sufficient. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 777 N.W.2d 617,624
(N.D.2010) (providing a comprehensive review of other jurisdictions' authenticity requirements
for electronic communications). Circumstantial proof might include the email address, cell phone
number, or screen name connected with the message; the content of the messages, facts included
within the text, or style of writing; and metadata such as the document's size, last modification
date, or the computer IP address." State v. Koch, at 157 Idaho 89, 334 P. 3d 380 (2014), citing

Fluker, 698 F.3d at 999; United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322-1323 (11th Cir.2000);
United States v. Sa/avian, 435 F.Supp.2d 36, 40-41 (D.D.C.2006). In that case, content alone
would not have been enough to establish authentication. The court stated, "Thus, the content
along with the identity of the number furnished sufficient authentication or identification to
support admissibility." Id. Even these standards, however, appear to be limited to technology,
which often have distinctive computer characteristics, but evidence of content alone allowing for
admission into evidence would lead to an absurd result.
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DATED this 15th day of November, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 15 h day of November, 2016, I caused a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below:

D Hand Delivery

Denutv
, ., Attornev
. General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Id 83720-0010
Fax: (208) 854-8074

~ U.S. Mail

D Overnight Courier
D Facsimile Transmission
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